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Practical quantum communication (QC) protocols are assumed to be secure provided implemented
devices are properly characterized and all known side channels are closed. We show that this is not
always true. We demonstrate a laser-damage attack capable of modifying device behaviour on-
demand. We test it on two practical QC systems for key distribution and coin-tossing, and show
that newly created deviations lead to side channels. This reveals that laser damage is a potential
security risk to existing QC systems, and necessitates their testing to guarantee security.
Cryptography, an art of secure communication, has tra-
ditionally relied on either algorithmic or computational
complexity [1]. Even the most state-of-the-art classical
cryptographic schemes do not have a strict mathemati-
cal proof to ascertain their security. With the advance
of quantum computing, it may be a matter of time be-
fore the security of the most widely used public-key cryp-
tography protocols is broken [2]. Quantum communica-
tion (QC) protocols, on the other hand, have theoreti-
cal proofs of being unconditionally secure [3–9]. In the-
ory, their security is based on the assumption of modeled
behaviour of implemented equipment. In practice, the
actual behaviour often deviates from the modeled one,
leading to a compromise of security as has been seen so
far in case of quantum key distribution (QKD) [10–16].
However, it is widely assumed that as long as these devi-
ations are properly characterized and security proofs are
updated accordingly [5, 17], implementations are uncon-
ditionally secure. In this work we show that satisfying
this during the initial installation only is not enough to
guarantee security. Even if a system is perfectly char-
acterized and deviations are included into the security
proofs, an adversary can still create a new deviation on-
demand and make the system insecure.
Before going into details on how the adversary may do
it, let’s consider a few examples of deviations and their
consequences. For example, a calibrated optical attenua-
tor is required to set a precise value of the outgoing mean
photon number µ in the implementations of ordinary
QKD [18, 19], decoy-state QKD [20], coherent-one-way
QKD [21], measurement-device-independent QKD [22],
continuous-variable QKD [23], digital signature [7], rela-
tivistic bit commitment [8], coin-tossing [24] and secret-
sharing [9] protocols. An unexpected increase of this
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optical component’s attenuation may cause a denial-of-
service. However, a reduction in attenuation will in-
crease µ, leading to a compromise of security via attacks
that rely on measurement of multi-photon pulses [25, 26].
E.g., in QKD and secret-sharing this will allow eaves-
dropping of the key, and in bit commitment cheating the
committed bit value. Some implementations use a detec-
tor for time synchronization [8, 9, 18, 19, 21–24]. Desen-
sitizing it may result in the denial-of-service. However,
several implementations require a calibrated monitoring
detector for security purposes [8, 9, 18, 19, 21, 23, 24].
A reduction in its sensitivity may lead to security vul-
nerabilities such as a Trojan-horse attack that reads the
state preparation [27]. This leaks the key in QKD, in-
creases the cheating probability in coin-tossing [26], leaks
the program and client’s data in quantum cloud comput-
ing [6] and allows forging of digital signatures [7]. Many
implementations use beamsplitters and rely on their pre-
characterized splitting ratio (e.g., [8, 18–21, 23, 24]). A
shift in the splitting ratio may lead to either the denial-
of-service or security vulnerabilities (e.g., [28] or one of
the above-mentioned attacks). A shift in characteristics
of a phase modulator or a Faraday mirror may create im-
perfect qubits that will result in the denial-of-service or
a breach in security [14, 15, 29]. If the dark count rate of
single-photon detectors is increased, it may lead to the
denial-of-service [30]. Even in device-independent QKD
(DI-QKD) [31], the absence of information-leakage chan-
nels and memory is assumed [32]. Thus, there is a risk
these assumptions may be compromised by deviations in
device characteristics. To give a speculative illustration,
let’s suppose detectors in DI-QKD emit light on detection
[33–35], and to prevent this leaking information about
detection results, spectral filters and optical isolators are
added to the devices. Then, unexpected deviations in
characteristics of the latter components become impor-
tant for security. In summary, quantum communication
systems rely on multiple characteristics of many compo-
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FIG. 1. Attack on fiber-optic system Clavis2. a, Experimental setup. The system consists of Alice and Bob connected
by a lossy fiber communication channel (simulated by variable optical attenuator VOA3). Bob sends to Alice pairs of bright
coherent optical pulses, produced by his laser and two fiber arms of unequal length [18, 19]. Alice uses fiber beamsplitters to
divert parts of incoming pulse energy to monitoring detector Dpulse, synchronization detector Dsync and line-loss measurement
detector Dcw. She prepares quantum states by phase-modulating the pulses, reflecting them at a Faraday mirror and attenuating
to single-photon level with VOA1. Bob measures the quantum states by applying his basis choice via phase modulator and
detecting outcome of quantum interference with single-photon avalanche photodetectors. Eve’s damaging laser is connected
to the channel manually. BPF, bandpass filter. b, Pulse-energy-monitoring photodiode before and after damage. Brightfield
microphotographs show top-view of decapsulated photodiode chips. The last two samples have holes melted through their
photosensitive area. Scattered dark specks are debris from decapsulation.
nents for their correct operation, and a deviation might
lead to severe security consequences.
In classical communications, there is no real concern
about the possibility of a shift in device characteristics.
Classical devices’ security-critical parts can be physically
separated from the communication channel and isolated
from physical access by the adversary [36]. However the
front-end of a quantum communication system is essen-
tially an analog optical system connected to the channel
(at least, at our present level of the technology), and is
easily accessible by the adversary. The latter can shoot
a high-power laser from the communication channel to
alter system component characteristics via laser dam-
age [30]. The question is what will this achieve? Will
the adversary break some component needed for opera-
tion and cause the denial-of-service (which is not a use-
ful outcome for her), or will she change some compo-
nent in such a way as to facilitate a compromise of secu-
rity? Further, will the security compromise be only pos-
sible in theory or be practical with today’s technology?
This cannot be predicted in advance, because system im-
plementations contain many components and their laser
damage thresholds and failure behavior are generally not
precisely known. To assess the risk for quantum com-
munications, we have performed tests on two extensively
characterized, completely different and widely used im-
plementations: a commercial fiber-optic system for QKD
and coin-tossing with phase-encoded qubits [18, 19], and
a free-space system for QKD with polarization-encoded
qubits [20]. In both systems, we have unfortunately ob-
served the best possible outcome for the adversary. After
the laser damage, the systems’ security has become com-
promisable with today’s technology.
Laser damage in fiber-optic system. As a repre-
sentative of a fiber-optic quantum communication imple-
mentation, we chose a plug-and-play QKD [18] and loss-
tolerant quantum coin tossing (QCT) [24]. Both were
implemented using a commercial system Clavis2 from
ID Quantique [19]. In both cases, Bob sends bright light
pulses to Alice. Alice randomly encodes her secret bits by
applying one out of four phases (0, pi2 , pi,
3pi
2 ), attenuates
the pulses and reflects them back to Bob (Fig. 1a). The
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FIG. 2. Attack on free-space QKD system. a, Experimental setup. QKD receiver Bob consists of two lenses L1, L2
reducing input beam diameter, 50:50 beamsplitter BS, and two arms measuring photons in HV and DA polarizations using
polarizing beamsplitters PBS [16, 20]. Photons are focused by lenses L3 into multimode fibers leading to single-photon detectors.
Setup drawing is not to scale. Eve’s apparatus contains a scanning laser source that tilts the beam angle (φ, θ) by laterally
shifting lens L4. Green marginal rays denote initial Eve’s alignment, replicating the alignment Alice–Bob at φ = θ = 0. Red
marginal rays show a tilted scanning beam missing fiber cores V, H, A, but coupling into D. Eve’s damaging laser source can
be manually inserted in place of the scanning source. Att., attenuator; PC, polarization controller. b, Spatial filter before and
after damage. Darkfield microphotographs show front view of the pinhole. See Appendix D for real-time video recording of
laser damage to the pinhole inside Bob.
security of both protocols requires an upper bound on the
mean photon number µ coming out of Alice. Otherwise,
an eavesdropper Eve can perform a Trojan-horse attack
[27] by superimposing extra light to the bright pulses on
their way to Alice from Bob. If Alice is unaware of this
and applies the same attenuation, then light coming out
of her has a higher µ than allowed by the security proofs
[5], making the implementations insecure. It is thus cru-
cial for the security of both protocols that Alice monitors
the incoming pulse energy. This is achieved by employing
a pulse-energy-monitoring detector (Dpulse in Fig. 1a). A
portion of the incoming light is fed to Dpulse such that
whenever extra energy is injected, an alarm is produced
[26]. The sensitivity of Dpulse is factory-calibrated, thus
closing the side-channel associated with the Trojan-horse
attack.
Our testing showed that this countermeasure is vul-
nerable to laser damage. During normal QKD operation,
we disconnected the fiber channel Alice–Bob temporarily
and connected Eve (Fig. 1a). She then injected 1550 nm
laser light from an erbium-doped fiber amplifier for 20–
30 s, delivering continuous-wave (c.w.) high power into
Alice’s entrance. 44% of this power reached the fiber-
pigtailed InGaAs p-i-n photodiode Dpulse (JDSU EPM
605LL), and damaged it partially or fully. It became ei-
ther less sensitive to incoming light (by 1–6 dB after 0.5–
1.5 W illumination at Alice’s entrance) or completely in-
sensitive (after ≥ 1.7 W). The physical damage is shown
in Fig. 1b. No other optical component was damaged
at this power level. We repeated the experiment with 6
photodiode samples. In half of these trials, QKD con-
tinued uninterrupted and kept producing more key af-
ter we reconnected the channel back to Bob, as if noth-
ing has happened. In the other half, a manual software
restart was needed. However, in all the trials the dam-
age was sufficient to permanently open the system up
to the Trojan-horse attack. As modeled in Ref. 26, in
the QKD protocol, Eve can eavesdrop partial or full key
using today’s best technology if the sensitivity of Dpulse
drops by more than 5.6 dB. In the QCT implementa-
tion, a sensitivity reduction by 2.6 dB can increase Bob’s
cheating probability above a classical level, removing any
quantum advantage of coin-tossing. Laser damage thus
compromises both the QKD and QCT implementations.
See Appendix A for details.
Laser damage in free-space system. As a rep-
resentative of free-space quantum communication, we
chose a long-distance satellite QKD prototype operating
at 532 nm wavelength [20] employing Bennett-Brassard
1984 (BB84) protocol [3]. At each time slot, Alice ran-
domly sends one out of four polarizations: horizontal
(H), vertical (V), +45◦ (D), or −45◦ (A) using a phase-
randomized attenuated laser. Bob randomly measures in
either horizontal-vertical (HV) or diagonal-antidiagonal
(DA) basis, using a polarization-beamsplitter receiver
(Fig. 2a). It has been shown in Ref. 16 that an eaves-
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FIG. 3. Efficiency-mismatch side-channel opened after laser damage in free-space QKD system. Each pair of
3D–2D plots shows normalised photon detection efficiency η in a receiver channel versus illuminating beam angles φ and θ.
a, Before laser damage, the angular dependence is essentially identical between the four channels [16]. Plot for one channel
(V) before damage is shown. b, After the laser damage, the four receiver channels H, V, D, A exhibit unequal sensitivity to
photons outside the middle area around φ = θ = 0. The last plot shows angular ranges for targeting the four detectors that
satisfy conditions for the faked-state attack.
dropper can, in practice, tilt the beam going towards Bob
by an angle (φ, θ) such that the beam misses, partially or
fully, the cores of fibers leading to three detectors while
being relatively well coupled into the core leading to the
fourth detector, as illustrated in Fig. 2a. This happens
because real-world optical alignments are inherently im-
perfect and manufacturing precision is finite. By send-
ing light at different spatial angles, the eavesdropper can
have control over Bob’s basis and measurement outcome
and steal the key unnoticed [13, 16, 37]. This attack can
be prevented by placing a spatial filter or ‘pinhole’ at the
focal plane of lenses L1 and L2, as shown in Fig. 2a [16].
Since the pinhole limits the field of view, any light enter-
ing at a higher spatial angle is blocked and Eve no longer
has access to the target angles required to have control
over Bob. As was demonstrated in Ref. 16, a pinhole of
25 µm diameter eliminates this side-channel by making
the angular efficiency dependence identical between the
four detectors (Fig. 3a).
Our testing showed that this countermeasure is de-
stroyed by laser damage. From a distance of 26.1 m, we
shot an 810 nm collimated laser beam delivering a 10 s
pulse of 3.6 W c.w. power at the pinhole inside Bob’s
setup. The intensity there was sufficient to melt the ma-
terial (13 µm thick stainless steel) and enlarge the hole
diameter to ≈ 150 µm. The state of the pinhole before
and after damage is shown in Fig. 2b, and a real-time
video of the damage process is shown in Appendix D.
Although Bob was up and running in photon counting
mode during the test, none of his other components were
damaged. With this larger pinhole opening, it was again
possible to send light at angles that had relatively higher
mismatches in efficiency, as shown in Fig. 3b. This en-
abled a faked-state attack under realistic conditions of
channel loss in 1–15 dB range with quantum bit error ra-
tio (QBER) < 6.6%. Thus laser damage completely neu-
tralizes this countermeasure, and makes this free-space
QKD system insecure. See Appendix B for details.
Discussion. The crucial step of the attack, creating
the deviation in device characteristics, has thus been ex-
perimentally demonstrated for both systems tested. We
repeated this step several times and confirmed that laser
power above a certain value (1.7 W in fiber-optic sys-
tem and 3.6 W in free-space one) always destroys the
security-critical component, without inflicting any col-
lateral damage that could result in the denial-of-service.
After this, building a complete eavesdropper would be a
realistic if time-consuming task [38].
In our testing, we haven’t done anything that Eve
could not do in the real world. She could buy a copy
of each system, rehearse her attacks, then attack an in-
stalled system of the same model. By Kerckhoffs’ prin-
ciple [39], Eve is assumed to know the system character-
istics and results of damage precisely. In practice when
attacking installed devices, if she needs to measure their
characteristics, she may probe them remotely by imag-
ing, reflectometry [27], and watching public communica-
tion Alice–Bob [37, 38].
At present, no quantum communication system has
countermeasures specifically designed to stop laser-
damage attack, neither do they have a mechanism to
check all possible deviations in device characteristics from
the modeled values. Countermeasures to other attacks do
not prevent this attack, in fact they become weak points
as our experimental study shows. Development of nec-
essary countermeasures is complicated by the fact that
Eve can use a laser with different characteristics: power,
timing (e.g., short-pulsed laser induces different dam-
age mechanisms than c.w. thermal damage we have ob-
served [40]), wavelength, polarization. Eve can attack the
systems in different phases of their operation including
powered-off state, which can control what component is
5damaged. We have experimentally observed dependence
of damage on the laser timing profile, as detailed in Ap-
pendix C, where we show that some profiles have resulted
in the denial-of-service but some in a successful attack.
We stress that Eve will select the illumination regime
that results in the successful attack, if such regime exists
at all. Any countermeasure must thus be tested in all
possible illumination regimes. Possible directions of de-
velopment include a passive optical power limiter [41], a
single-use ‘fuse’ that permanently breaks the optical con-
nection if a certain power is exceeded, battery-powered
active monitoring supplemented with wavelength filter-
ing, or an optical isolator (for Alice that uses one-way
light propagation [6, 7, 20–23, 31, 38]). Hardware self-
characterization may be promising [42], however to pro-
tect from an arbitrary damage it must monitor a poten-
tially large number of hardware parameters.
It is an interesting question if risk for untested sys-
tem designs can be estimated. As we have discussed,
any given system design contains many optical compo-
nents with unknown damage characteristics. The out-
come of damage (denial-of-service or successful attack) is
thus impossible to predict prior to testing. Then, if some
of the system designs chosen at random were tested, the
risk for the remaining untested designs could be calcu-
lated by Bayesian statistics [43]. Unfortunately, truly
random choice is impractical to implement with the cur-
rent state of quantum communications research and lim-
ited sample availability. We have instead tested the two
system designs that were available in our lab. This bi-
ased the choice towards more mature and older designs.
Although this unknown bias makes the Bayesian analy-
sis inapplicable, we find it illustrative to consider the risk
figure that would have applied if the choice were random.
With zero systems tested, the Bayesian probability that
at least 20% of the untested system designs (assuming
at least 50 of them exist) are vulnerable to this attack is
70.4% (80%), assuming a Jeffreys (uniform) prior. If two
randomly chosen system designs were tested with two
positive outcomes, this probability would have increased
greatly to 98.9% (98.6%). Note that the security risk is
generally high, which is in stark contrast with the very
low expected theoretical risk [4, 5, 17].
We have experimentally demonstrated laser damage
as a new eavesdropping tool that alters parameters of a
well-characterized quantum communication system. Any
modification of system characteristics might compromise
the security either directly by leading to an attack as
we have demonstrated, or indirectly by shifting some pa-
rameter in the security proof so it would no longer apply.
Existing security proofs do not accommodate this, nei-
ther do existing systems have any countermeasure imple-
mented against this. Our results thus reveal the potential
security risk for other existing systems, which should be
tested against this attack.
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Appendix A: Laser-damage experiment on
fiber-optic system
In our experiment, we damaged Dpulse during QKD oper-
ation, trying not to interrupt it. The system was allowed
to start up and produce a secret key for several QKD
cycles, using BB84 protocol [3]. To perform laser dam-
age, we disconnected the channel for 2–3 min, giving us
enough time to apply high power to Alice, and then re-
connected the channel. We tried this at different points
in the QKD operation cycle. Sometimes the software re-
covered and resumed QKD, and sometimes it got stuck in
recalibration routines. In the latter case, a manual soft-
ware restart resumed QKD. Owing to a limited number
of trials, we did not perfect this timing aspect.
We tested a total of 6 photodiode samples. We dam-
aged each of them by applying high power laser light
at Alice’s entrance. We then used the manufacturer’s
factory-calibration software to measure how much extra
signal power (compared to the pre-calibrated power level)
could be injected without triggering the alarm [26]. This
quantified the reduction in sensitivity due to the dam-
age. Three samples were exposed twice to a progressively
higher power. For example, one sample was first exposed
to 0.5 W power at Alice’s entrance that reduced its pho-
tosensitivity by 1 dB, then to 0.75 W power that reduced
its photosensitivity by 6 dB. For the other two samples
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FIG. 4. Fiber-optic QKD system operation during
laser damage. The plot shows accumulated secret key
amount versus time. Grey bands denote the system perform-
ing recalibration routines, white bands denote the quantum
bit sending and receiving, and blue (darker) bands denote
classical post-processing. All this information was extracted
from the QKD system log files after the experiment. The
band hatched in red denotes the time when the fiber channel
Alice–Bob was temporarily disconnected and the laser dam-
age to Alice was done by 1.7 W laser power, resulting in Dpulse
becoming an open circuit with no photosensitivity.
these numbers were 0.75 W with no change in sensitiv-
ity then 1.0 W, 1.6 dB (shown in 2nd microphotograph
in Fig. 1b); 1.0 W, 5 dB then 1.5 W, 5.5 dB (shown
in 3rd microphotograph in Fig. 1b). For the remaining
three samples, 1.7 W was applied at Alice’s entrance, and
Dpulse completely lost photosensitivity, becoming elec-
trically either a large resistor (shown in 4th micropho-
tograph in Fig. 1b) or an open circuit. After we were
done with each sample, we used the same manufacturer’s
factory-calibration software to pre-calibrate the sensitiv-
ity of the next undamaged Dpulse sample, following the
factory procedure.
No other component in Alice was damaged during
these trials. We also tested some components separately.
FC/PC and FC/APC optical connectors used in Alice
and in the channel withstood 3 W c.w., while copies
of Alice’s 10:90 fiber beamsplitters (AFW Technologies
FOSC-1-15-10-L-1-S-2) withstood up to 8 W c.w. with
no damage.
Figure 4 summarizes a system operation log when it
recovered automatically after the damage that made the
photodiode an open-circuit with no photosensitivity. In
the current system implementation, this represents an
ideal outcome for an attacker.
For damaging and component tests, Eve used an
erbium-doped fiber amplifier seeded from a 1550.7 nm
laser source (EDFA; IPG Photonics ELR-70-1550-LP).
She injected 0–2 W c.w. power at Alice’s entrance. The
injected power was monitored with a 1:99 fiber beam-
splitter tap and a power meter (Fig. 1a). A manually
operated shutter at the output of EDFA allowed to ramp
the power up and down smoothly between 0 and the tar-
get level, with tens of milliseconds transition time. The
spectral characteristics of EDFA’s built-in seed laser did
not precisely match the passband of the BPF at Alice’s
entrance (1551.32–1552.12 nm passband at−0.5 dB level,
< 0.7 dB insertion loss; AFW Technologies BPF-1551.72-
2-B-1-1). We therefore removed the BPF for the dura-
tion of experiment. The BPF was separately tested in-
passband using a different EDFA (PriTel LNHPFA-37)
with a narrowband seed laser, and passed more than 1 W
c.w. with no damage.
The system QKD software (‘QKD Sequence’ applica-
tion [19]) set the variable attenuator VOA2 at 2 dB.
Thus, 44% of Alice’s incoming light impinged Dpulse,
while smaller fractions impinged Dsync and Dcw. The
alarm threshold of Dpulse is calibrated when the system
is assembled at the factory, and is not changed after that
[26]. VOA3 introduced channel loss of 1.87 dB, to simu-
late the effect of ≈9 km long fiber line Alice–Bob.
The QKD system Clavis2 normally operates automat-
ically in cycles consisting of sending and receiving quan-
tum states until either the memory buffer is full or pho-
ton detection efficiency has dropped significantly. It then
uses the classical link Alice–Bob to post-process the de-
tected data and distill the secret key [10]. Each cycle
takes several minutes. If the last QKD cycle was inter-
rupted because the detection efficiency was too low, or
the key distillation failed, the system returns to start-up
routines such as timing recalibration [44] before it re-
sumes sending quantum states. This happens often in
normal operation, because of naturally occurring drift
of hardware and channel parameters. The software gen-
erally tries to recover automatically from various error
conditions, to provide long-term unattended operation
[45].
Predicted attacks on fiber-optic system with dam-
aged pulse-energy-monitoring photodiode. As
modeled in Ref. 26, for BB84 QKD protocol Eve can
eavesdrop partial or full key information using today’s
best photonics technologies when the sensitivity of Dpulse
has dropped by 4.3–5.6 dB, given that communication
channel loss Alice–Bob is in a 1–7 dB range. (This corre-
sponds to a multiplication factor x in the range of 2.7–3.6,
see Fig. 11 in Ref. 26.) If we assume that Eve’s equip-
ment is only limited by the laws of quantum mechanics,
then she can extract the full key information after only
0.4–0.8 dB reduction in sensitivity (x of 1.1–1.2). Simi-
larly, for QCT with a dishonest Bob only limited by the
quantum mechanics, all the quantum advantages of the
protocol are eliminated if sensitivity reduction of 2.6 dB
is obtained in Alice (x = 1.805), for a 15 km long commu-
nication channel. For a 10 dB sensitivity reduction, Bob’s
cheating probability approaches unity [26]. Since we have
surpassed the above sensitivity reduction thresholds in
our laser damage experiment, we consider the security of
both QKD and QCT implementation compromised.
Appendix B: Laser-damage experiment on
free-space QKD system
In order to neutralize the effect of the pinhole and
reproduce the side-channel of spatial-mode detector-
efficiency mismatch, our experiment consisted of three
7steps. Firstly, we performed scanning to certify that the
system is secure against this side-channel. Secondly, we
laser-damaged the pinhole to open the side-channel. Fi-
nally, we performed scanning again to demonstrate that
the system’s security has been compromised. In all three
steps, Eve was placed at a distance of 26.1 m away from
Bob and the steps were performed in sequence without
making any interactions with Bob.
The first step involved changing the outgoing beam’s
angle (φ, θ) emitted from Eve’s scanning setup shown in
Fig. 2a, then recording the corresponding count rate at
all four detectors in Bob. This step is identical to that in
Ref. 16. The scanning result is shown in Fig. 3a, where
a pair of 3D–2D plots shows the normalized photon de-
tection efficiency in one receiver channel versus the il-
luminating beam angles φ and θ. With the pinhole in
place, the angular dependence of efficiency is essentially
identical between the four channels, hence only a plot for
channel V is shown. No measurable amount of efficiency
mismatch was found and no attack angles existed [16].
Then as the second step, Eve’s scanning setup was re-
placed with the damaging setup. The latter contained a
810 nm laser diode (Jenoptik JOLD-30-FC-12) pumped
by a current-stabilized power supply and connected to
200 µm core diameter multimode fiber. It provided con-
tinuously adjustable 0 to 30 W c.w. power into the fiber.
An almost-collimated free-space beam was subsequently
formed by a plano-convex lens L5 (Thorlabs LA1131-B;
Fig. 2a). The beam’s intensity was nearly uniformly dis-
tributed across Bob’s L1 (50 mm diameter achromatic
doublet, Thorlabs AC508-250-A), with less than ±10%
intensity fluctuation across Bob’s input aperture. Trans-
mission of L1 was about 82%, owing to its antireflec-
tion coating being designed for a different wavelength
band. In the test detailed here, the power delivered at
the pinhole plane was 3.6 W, sufficient to reliably pro-
duce a hole of ≈ 150 µm diameter in less than 10 s in
a standard stainless-steel foil pinhole (Thorlabs P25S).
We tested several pinholes and found that this power al-
ways made the hole. We also tested that power decreased
to 2.0 W still produced a hole. No other component in
Bob was damaged during the tests. Bob’s lenses L3 re-
ceived ∼ 1 µW power each, and single-photon detectors
only received on the order of a few nW each, mainly
owing to the presence of BPF after the pinhole. The
BPF was used by Bob to increase the signal-to-noise ra-
tio during QKD by heavily attenuating all light outside
the 531–533 nm passband (it consisted of two stacked
filters, Thorlabs FESH0700 followed by Semrock LL01-
532-12-5) [20]. While the damaging beam was on, the
detectors counted at their saturation rate of ∼ 35 MHz,
which did not look abnormal to Bob as this sometimes
occurs naturally owing to atmospheric conditions (during
sunset, sunrise, fog). We remark that this type of detec-
tor usually survives tens of mW for a short time [30, 46].
Even if we had to use a wavelength within the BPF’s
passband, detector exposure to higher power could likely
be avoided by shaping Eve’s damaging beam.
After the damage, as the third step we replaced the
damaging setup with the scanning setup again, and per-
formed the final scanning of Bob’s receiver with the dam-
aged pinhole. The results are shown in Fig. 3b. Now,
the four receiver channels H, V, D, A exhibited unequal
sensitivity to photons outside the middle area around
φ = θ = 0. These efficiency plots were different from
those measured in Ref. 16 without the pinhole, because
of extra scattering at the edges of our laser-enlarged pin-
hole.
Predicted attack on free-space QKD system with
damaged pinhole. We model a practical faked-state
attack as described in Ref. 16. We assume a part of
Eve is situated outside Alice and measures the quantum
states coming out. Then, another part of her regener-
ates the measured quantum states as attenuated coher-
ent pulses and sends them to Bob, tilting her beam at
an angle such that it has a relatively higher probability
of being detected by the desired detector. Eve has in-
formation about Bob’s receiver characteristics after the
laser damage, and only uses devices available in today’s
technology [16]. For example, let’s assume Eve sends
a horizontally polarized light pulse. In this case, she
should choose her tilt angle (φ, θ) from a subset H˜ se-
lected in such a way that the efficiency ηh(H˜) of Bob’s
horizontal channel in H˜ is as high as possible, in order
to maximize mutual information Eve–Bob. On the other
hand, if Bob measures in the opposite (DA) basis, the
detection probabilities in the D and A channels ηd(H˜)
and ηa(H˜) should be as low as possible, to minimize
QBER. Thus, to find attack angles for the horizontally
polarized light, we choose H˜ that satisfies ηh(H˜) ≥ 0.6
and δ(H˜) = min
{
ηh(H˜)
ηd(H˜)
, ηh(H˜)
ηa(H˜)
}
≥ 100. Similarly, for
V, D and A polarized pulses, we choose attack angles
that satisfy ηv(V˜ ) ≥ 0.03, δ(V˜ ) ≥ 4.5; ηd(D˜) ≥ 0.6,
δ(D˜) ≥ 120; ηa(A˜) ≥ 0.2, δ(A˜) ≥ 22. These subsets of
angles are shown in the rightmost plot in Fig. 3b. Note
that the thresholds η and δ used here are not optimal
and have been picked manually. However, they satisfy
the required conditions to successfully perform the faked-
state attack with a resultant QBER ≤ 6.6% in 1–15 dB
channel loss range, as shown in Fig. 5. In the simula-
tion, we assumed that Alice–Bob and Alice–Eve fidelity
F = 0.9831 [16, 20], while Eve–Bob experimentally mea-
sured F = 0.9904. All other assumptions were the same
as in Ref. 16.
Appendix C: Deviation that has led to a
denial-of-service, and how we avoided it
Alice’s setup in Clavis2 (Fig. 1a) consists of more than
20 discrete optical components: over 10 fiber connec-
tors, 3 beamsplitters, 3 detectors, 2 variable attenuators,
a bandpass filter, phase modulator, and Faraday mir-
ror. As discussed in main text, certain deviations in any
of these components lead to the denial-of-service, while
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FIG. 5. Modeled QBER observed by Bob in free-space
QKD system. The dotted curve shows QBER without Eve.
At lower channel loss, the QBER is due to imperfect fidelity,
while at higher channel loss Bob’s detector background counts
become the dominant contribution. The lower solid curve
(blue) shows QBER under our attack when only Bob’s sifted
key rate is kept the same as before the attack. The upper
solid curve (red) additionally keeps the same sifted key rates
conditioned on each polarization sent by Alice, which more
closely mimics a realistic system operation (see Ref. 16 for
details).
other deviations result in opening different security loop-
holes. Attacker’s goal, and the goal of a thorough se-
curity tester, is to do one’s best to avoid the former and
demonstrate the latter. Parameters of the damaging laser
illumination can and should be varied to reach this goal.
When we began testing the system components for
laser damage, the synchronization detector Dsync initially
presented an obstacle. This detector was based on an op-
tical receiver module (Fujitsu FRM5W232BS) incorpo-
rating an avalanche photodiode biased below breakdown
at > 30 V, providing an avalanche multiplication factor
≈6. It only took about 6 mW of optical power at the pho-
todiode (translating to about 0.15 W at Alice’s entrance)
to die. It stopped providing the synchronization signal
for Alice and thus broke the system, i.e., led to the denial-
of-service. After an investigation, it turned out that the
energy that killed it was chiefly provided by its high-
voltage electrical bias circuit and not the optical signal.
The bias circuit was based on a specialised integrated
circuit with overcurrent protection (Maxim Integrated
MAX1932ETC) followed by an LC low-pass filter with
inductor L = 330 µH and capacitor C = 0.47 µF. If the
optical power is applied suddenly, with sub-nanosecond
rise time, it momentarily induces a large photocurrent
supplied from C that destroys the avalanche photodiode.
If, however, the optical power is applied gradually, with
millisecond rise time, C discharges slowly and then the
relatively slow overcurrent protection reacts in the inte-
grated circuit, lowers the bias voltage and saves the pho-
todiode. We thus added a manual shutter to the EDFA
to make the damaging power rise from zero slowly, allow-
ing Dsync to easily withstand the optical power used in
our attack while being electrically powered up. Another
solution could be to damage the system when it is with-
out electrical power. It can also be said that we could
choose to selectively damage one of two components in
Alice, albeit one of them bricking the system.
We ran our damage tests with VOA2 (OZ Op-
tics DD-600-11-1300/1550-9/125-S-40-3S3S-1-1-485:1-5-
MC/IIC) set at 2 dB, because this is what the manu-
facturer’s QKD software available for the research sys-
tem Clavis2 set it at. The support of the pulse-energy-
monitoring countermeasure was not implemented in this
software [26]. In contrast, the manufacturer’s factory-
calibration software supported it fully and set VOA2 be-
tween 2 and ≈15 dB, complementary to the channel loss,
in order to maintain constant power at the three Alice’s
detectors Dpulse, Dsync, and Dcw. The higher settings of
VOA2 would require more laser power to damage Dpulse.
However, Dpulse could also be damaged during the sys-
tem start-up time, when it sends the homing command
to VOA2. The homing command causes it to traverse its
lowest attenuation values for a few seconds, likely being
sufficient for Eve to do the damage at already demon-
strated power levels.
Appendix D: Real-time video recording of laser
damage to the spatial filter inside Bob’s setup
Download the video at http://vad1.com/
pinhole-laser-damage-20140825.wmv (Windows
Media Video, 14.4 MiB) or http://vad1.com/
pinhole-laser-damage-20140825.ppsx (Power-
Point Show, 17.0 MiB). The video shows the spatial
filter (Thorlabs P20S) illuminated by 3.6 W c.w. 810 nm
laser beam for 10 s, focused in a spot much wider than
the original pinhole diameter of 20 µm. This is a filter
sample with a slightly smaller original pinhole diameter
than the one used to obtain efficiency mismatch data
in this article and shown in Fig. 2b. The samples were
otherwise of the same type and damaged under the same
conditions. The video was taken via a mirror lowered
inside Bob’s setup. The pinhole plane was imaged from
the front side at an angle slightly off normal, in order for
the mirror not to obstruct the damaging beam. Canon
MP-E 65 mm lens was used at 2.8× magnification
and f/16 lens aperture (f/60 effective aperture), with
Canon EOS 7D camera body. The pinhole was brightly
lit sideways with a fiber-optic illuminator bundle, in
order to bring up detail. During the laser exposure,
the steel foil can be seen deforming from heat, popping
out of focus and apparently shifting laterally in the
image; however the lateral shift is an artefact of the
camera’s angle of view being off-normal. After the laser
is switched off, the foil cools and returns to the original
position, now with about 150 µm diameter hole in it.
Sound was added later for an artistic effect.
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